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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
During this survey period there were no criminal law cases
which had the effect of changing existing South Carolina law;
however, as a consequence of the increasing encroachment by
the United States Supreme Court into areas of local law admin-
istration, our state cases must be read in the light of the trend
of the Court. Of special interest in the field of criminal law
is the recent case of Miranda v. Arizona.1 This survey period
covered only cases prior to the handing down of Miranda, and
it has been held that Miranda is not retroactive ;2 however,
three South Carolina cases during this period dealing with the
question of confessions and the right to counsel were reversed
on other grounds and sent back for new trials. Although no
authority has been found on this precise point, it would seem
that the rules enunciated in Miranda would apply to prevent the
state from using evidence dealing with confessions at these sub-
sequent de novo trials. So Miranda may yet affect their final
disposition.
The issue of the negotiated guilty plea and its relationship
to the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial on the
merits was given brief consideration in this article as was the
issue of the Supreme Court's influence in state post-conviction
remedies.
I. RIGHT TO CoUNsEL
In State v. GaMble8 the accused was arrested and charged
with rape. He was advised of his right to remain silent but
was not advised of his right to counsel. The accused later con-
fessed to the crime. The state argued that the confession was
voluntary; it was admitted into evidence over the objection of
counsel for the accused, and the defendant was found guilty and
sentenced to death. Upon appeal, the court held that the con-
fession was validly admitted into evidence. The court based its
opinion upon the Escobedo v. Illnoi s# decision. Viewing the
surrounding circumstances of the confession, the court held that
the confession was voluntary and that in South Carolina the
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
3. 247 S.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 709 (1966).
4. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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critical stage does not come prior to arraignment,5 and therefore
the right to counsel did not attach prior to the time of the
incriminating statement. However, as a consequence of an error
relating to another aspect of the confession, the conviction was
reversed and the case was sent back for a new trial. Therefore
it would seem that this case upon re-trial would be affected by
the Miranda decision. Since the accused was not immediately
upon arrest advised of his right to counsel, court-appointed if
necessary, the confession in all likelihood will not be admissible
into evidence.
The defendant in State v. Cain6 was arrested and charged
with murder. While at police headquarters the accused was
advised of his right to counsel. Evidence was offered by the
state to show that the accused waived this right and later con-
fessed to the crime. The confession was admitted into evidence
at trial over objection and the accused was convicted and sen-
tenced to death.
However, this case also was reversed on other grounds and
sent back for a new trial. On re-trial the court will be con-
fronted with the waiver provision in Miranda. Not only must
the state advise an accused of his rights, but it must also bear
the burden of proving that the accused was aware of these rights
and intelligently waived them.7  The specific standards for
ascertaining the validity of a waiver were not set out in Mi-
randa. It is obvious, however, that since the Court has serious
misgivings about the voluntariness of jailhouse confessions, it
will also cast a dubious eye toward jailhouse waivers. The
presence of some independent third party, such as a magistrate,
may be required at this point.
The case of Bostick v. State8 concerned a habeas corpus peti-
tion for review of the proceedings of a trial at which the peti-
tioner was sentenced to death for the murder of the sheriff of
Jasper County. The petitioner was arrested subsequent to the
crime and informed of his various rights including that of
assistance of counsel. Counsel was not requested. Thereafter
petitioner made a confession which was admitted into evidence
at the trial. The petitioner claimed that the absence of counsel
5. State v. White, 243 S.C. 238, 133 S.E2d 320 (1963).
6. 246 S.C. 536, 144 S.E.2d 905 (1965).
7. For discussion of Miranda and the waiver provision see Comment, 18
S.C.L. RFv. 853 (1966).
8. 247 S.C. 22, 145 S.E2d 439 (1965).
1967]
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rendered the confession void, but the court once again cited
Escobedo and held that, under the circumstances, absence of
counsel did not render the confession inadmissible. So the peti-
tion was denied. Here, as in Gamble and Cain, the issue of
waiver was not developed nor was the issue of whether petitioner
was offered free counsel. The United States Supreme Court,
however, has just reversed this decision on other grounds and
ordered a new trial.9 Therefore the issues concerning the confes-
sion may yet be relitigated in the light of Miranda.
In State v. Lee10 the defendant had been arrested on a charge
of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alco-
hol. The South Carolina Highway Patrol did not inform him
that he had a right to remain silent, that his statements would
be used against him, or that he had a right to counsel. The
defendant was taken to jail and was not allowed to use the
telephone. He made certain incriminating statements that were
offered into evidence against him at magistrate's court. The
state appealed a general sessions reversal of the conviction in the
magistrate's court. The circuit judge, without citation of any
authority, had reversed and remanded the case on the basis
that the constitutional rights of the accused had been violated.
In reversing the circuit court, the supreme court held that the
circumstances of the instant case had no relationship to those in
Escobedo. Considering the admissibility of the incriminating
statements the court said:
We know of no case holding that a highway patrolman is
required to warn a traffic violator as to his constitutional
rights before engaging in a routine conversation with such
violator. Neither do we know of any decision that has gone
so far as to hold that such a traffic violator must be fur-
nished with counsel immediately upon arrest.11
This case presents a very interesting question. Miranda de-
mands that an accused have the right to counsel immediately
upon arrest, but the decision does not say how far down along
the criminal scale this right attaches. Gideonb v. Wainwright 2
left this question open, and only vague and general terms have
9. Bostick v. State, __ U.S. - (1967). See text accompanying note 17
infra.
10. 246 S.C. 311, 143 S.E.2d 604 (1965).
11. Id. at 316, 143 S.E2d at 606.
12. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
[Vol. 19
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been used in this area.18 Therefore until the Supreme Court is
presented with a case directly in point, the issue will remain
unsettled.
Although due process of law does require that defendants
accused of certain crimes have the right to assistance of counsel,
there is no requirement that there be perfection on the part of
the attorney. The court in -WeloA v. AacDoug& 14 held that a
lack of effective assistance of counsel must be of such nature
as to shock the conscience of the court and make the trial pro-
ceedings a farce and mockery of justice.
II. INDICTMNT
In State v. Defee' 5 defendants were indicted for violating
and for conspiring to violate an obscenity statute, section 16414
of the South Carolina Code. The indictment was quashed by the
circuit court and the state appealed. The supreme court adopted
the opinion of the, circuit court and based the decision upon the
actions of the South Carolina Legislature concerning the ob-
scenity area and upon judicial action dealing with analogous
legislative changes of the law.
At the time of arrest, section 16414 was in effect; however,
between the time of arrest and trial, various changes of this
section were considered and Act 265 of the South Carolina Acts
and Joint Resolutions (1965) was passed. A comparison of the
new act and section 16-414 revealed that all the areas covered
by 16414 were encompassed by the new act. The circuit court
held that since there was no savings clause, which would gen-
erally be included if the old section were not to be superseded,
the earlier statute was, in effect, repealed. Therefore the indict-
ments against all the defendants were quashed and the arrest
warrants were vacated.
III. Sp~ny TiAL
The issue of the constitutional right to a speedy trial was
presented on petition for the writ of habeas corpus in TVheeler
13. For discussion of this problem see Myers, A View of the Proposed
Defense of Indigents Act, 18 S.C.L. REv. 403, 408 (1966). The South Caro-
lina Proposed Defense of Indigents Act provides that the possibility of a six
months' sentence determines whether a person is entitled to appointment of
counsel.
14. 246 S.C. 258, 143 S.E.2d 455 (1965).
15. 246 S.C. 555, 144 S.E.2d 806 (1965).
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v. State.10 Petitioner had been held prisoner in the Greenville
County jail for more than eight months between his arrest in
the latter part of February 1964 and his trial early in Novem-
ber. The court held that the right to a speedy trial is necessarily
relative and depends upon the circumstances involved. In this
case the situation was such that the petitioner's trial quite rea-
sonably would not have commenced as promptly as otherwise;
the appellant was one of several persons charged in two separate
indictments with four different crimes. However, the court
found it unnecessary to go into this issue. It held that the peti-
tioner had in effect waived his constitutional right and was in
no position to invoke the protection of any constitutional man-
date. Although for the first six months the petitioner was rep-
resented by employed counsel, no demand for trial or discharge
was made. Also, upon the call of the case, a continuance was
asked for and granted. The petitioner then voluntarily entered
a plea of guilty without reserving his prior motion to quash
the indictment. Therefore the question of a denial of a speedy
trial was no longer open for litigation.
IV. JuRY DisomnmAToIN
In Bostick v. State6 7 the court once again was confronted with
the issue of whether the state constitution and statutory laws
relating to the qualifications and methods of selection of jurors
were discriminatory against Negroes. In resolving the question
against the contention of the petitioner, the court cited the
recent case of Moorer v. State-" and held that the petitioner had
not established a prima facie case of systematic exclusion. Al-
though there was testimony by one witness that during the past
years he had seen no Negroes on the petit jury and not more
than one Negro on the grand jury, the court records showed
that one Negro had been on the grand jury which returned a
true bill against the petitioner in the instant case and that two
Negroes had been on the panel of petit jurors at the term the
petitioner was tried. Bosticko was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, and on Monday, March 27, 1967, the Court
reversed this decision.
V. NEGomATmE Gumur PiaAs
In Bailey v. MacDougall'9 a habeas corpus petitioner claimed
that his plea of guilty to murder was involuntary because it
16. 247 S.C. 393, 147 S.E.2d 627 (1966).
17. 247 S.C. 22, 145 S.E.2d 439 (1965).
18. 244 S.C. 102, 135 S.E.2d 713 (1964).
19. 247 S.C. 1, 145 S.E.2d 425 (1965).
[Vol. 19
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was induced from him by false promises and misrepresentations
by the solicitor and police chief. Evidence was introduced to
show that the solicitor had made a written promise providing
that if the defendant would enter a plea of guilty of murder,
the solicitor would recommend pardon or parole after a period
of ten years had been served. The circuit judge granted the
petitioner a full hearing and found that the guilty plea was
induced by the agreement, that the petitioner had understood
that he would serve only ten years or less, and that the peti-
tioner was led to believe that the state was bound by the solici-
tor's actions.
In reversing this decision the supreme court held that the
agreement by the solicitor and the chief of police to recommend
a pardon or parole after ten years did not in fact destroy the
voluntariness of the plea and that there- was nothing to show
that the plea was induced by coercion, false promises or mis-
representation. The record showed that at no time was there
any conversation between the solicitor and the defendant con-
cerning the entry of the plea and that the defendant was repre-
sented by capable, retained counsel who fully explained to the
defendant the meaning and consequences of the negotiations
with the solicitor. The record also showed that the solicitor and
police chief had in fact fulfilled their obligations by recom-
mending to the board of pardons or governor that leniency be
shown.
Much comment has been directed toward this issue of negoti-
ated guilty pleas and the effect such pleas have upon due proc-
ess of law.20 Although the principle is well established that a
plea of guilty must be freely made and cannot be accepted if
induced by promises which deprive it of the nature of a volun-
tary act, too often the courts ignore underlying factors which
constitute coercion. However voluntary it may appear, the
negotiated guilty plea is, in effect, a flagrant tool for subtle
coercion.
Negotiation is primarily an administrative device used by
state prosecutors, limited by staff and budget, to avoid the
burden of having to produce evidence to prove guilt.21 It is
20. E.g., Dash, Cracks i the Foundation of Crimial Justice, 46 Iu. L.
REv. 385, 392 (1951); Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057 (1955); Note, 33
CORNm.LL L.Q. 407 (1948).
21. See Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1057, 1070 (1955); Note, 33 CoaxE.
L.Q. 407, 409 (1948).
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prompted also by the realization that regardless of the strength
of a case a conviction at trial is not a certainty. Therefore the
public representative responsible for the prosecution of criminal
offenders bargains with the accused, through the use of society's
claims, in order to secure a waiver of his constitutional right to
trial. It would seem also that the desire for an impressive
record of convictions and impotent investigation and prepara-
tion could be interrelated with the practice of negotiation.
In order to entice a guilty plea, the state presents to the
accused an offer to prosecute only for the lessor of several
charges entailing less severe punishment than the crime charged
in the initial indictment. The defendant may plead guilty with
the expectation of thereby obtaining reduced punishment for
his crimes. The consequences of the negotiated guilty plea do
not end at this stage. The usual tendency of the courts is to
award a lenient judicial sentence following such plea.22
The primary reason for the granting of lenient sentences by
the court seems to be that the court is much impressed by a
wayward soul manifesting repentant supplications. If the ac-
cused were not aware of the fruits of his actions, derived from
the leniency of both prosecutor and judge, it could well be pos-
sible that a guilty plea evidenced a step toward rehabilitation.
However, the kmowledge of a mitigated punishment, implanted
by the negotiating prosecutor, taints the value of the plea as a
gauge of character.
The combination of the prosecutor's negotiating and the
resultant lenient sentence introduces the likelihood that a de-
fendant will obtain dual sentencing advantages. A paradox
thus results: one defendant, originally indicted for the more
serious of two related offenses, by pleading guilty may incur
less severe punishment than another defendant charged only
with the minor offense and proven guilty at trial. Herein lies
the coercion, because a price tag is placed upon the constitu-
tionally guaranteed right to a trial on the merits of a criminal
charge brought by the state. An accused who receives a harsher
punishment for his exercise of this right pays a judicially
imposed penalty. This discrepancy between the sentences to be
imposed following trial convictions and guilty pleas magnifies
the accused's fear of standing trial and proscribes freedom of
22. King, Criminal Procedure from the Viewpoint of the Trial Judge, 25
Conr. B.J. 202 (1951).
[Vol. 19
7
Curlee: Criminal Law and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 1967
9m..]..AL LAW AND PRocwuMM SURwE
choice. The innocent accused, therefore, receives the full brunt
of the subtle coercion which is inherent in the policy of nego-
tiating the claims of society and manipulating the scales of
justice. While variable sentencing may constitute a reward for
the culpable defendant, viewed through the eyes of an innocent
accused it represents a veritable hoisted axe.
The absence of the practice of negotiating would not neces-
sarily put an end to guilty pleas and strangle the already
crowded criminal dockets. Faced with convincing evidence of
guilt, an accused will likely enter a guilty plea for reasons of
expediency by his own free choice. If proper investigation and
professional case development by the prosecutor is the problem
at hand, then this segment of criminal law enforcement needs
the attention and aid of the state. The end product of negoti-
ated guilty pleas is not administrative efficiency-it is com-
promised justice.
VI. SoMOcoR AN JUnGE
The court in State v. White2 3 for the second time reversed a
death sentence conviction for rape and remanded the case for a
new trial. The court held that the argument by the solicitor
asking jurors to imagine their mothers, wives, sisters and daugh-
ters in the place of the victim was reversibly erroneous where
the jury failed to recommend mercy. Wide discretion is allowed
the trial judge in dealing with the propriety of argument of
counsel, but here the court found that the trial judge did not
properly counteract the argument which the court found to be
materially prejudicial.
The state, basing its case on the decision in State v. Gadstrap,
2 4
contended that even if the argument were improper it could not
have prejudiced the defendant because of the overwhelming
proof of guilt against him. The court held, however, that by
relating the circumstances of the case to the loved ones of the
jury the solicitor injected foreign considerations into the case
and thereby removed from the trial the element of impartiality.
In a strong dissent, Acting Justice Legge questioned the
basis for reversal and expressed his opinion that "to forbid
argument such as is here condemned would unduly restrict the
23. 246 S.C. 502, 144 S.E.2d 481 (1965).
24. 205 S.C. 412, 32 S.E2d 163 (1944).
19671
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solicitor's function as the representative of society in capital
cases.)
25
It appears that the court in considering this capital case was
ultimately and primarily concerned with the issue of mercy and
with the jury's absolute discretion in this regard. And it would
seem that in order to resolve this subjective issue of mercy one
would quite naturally relate his family to the crime involved.
It is submitted, therefore, that it is difficult to see how the
element of impartiality was prejudiced by the solicitor's argu-
ment. A crime committed upon any member of society is in
effect a crime committed upon each member thereof.
The appellant in State v. Milson,26 was convicted and sen-
tenced for official misconduct as clerk of court. He contended
that the trial judge erred in charging any statutory provisions
to the jury since the state consistently insisted that its position
was that the offense of official misconduct was a common law
offense. The trial judge charged the jury with the provisions of
sections 14-3624, 15-1782 and 15-1785 of the South Carolina Code
appertaining to the duties of the appellant in connection with
fees and fines collected by him. However, at the conclusion of
the charge the defendant made no objection. Therefore the court
held that on appeal it was too late to voice a complaint. The
court added, nevertheless, that appellant's guilt of any official
misconduct had to be determined in the light of what his duties
were under the law and, therefore, that no prejudicial error was
committed.
In State v. Clain27 the defendant, charged with murder, had
been previously confined to the state hospital with a mental
condition diagnosed as schizophrenic reaction of the paranoid
type and had been released only approximately two and a half
months prior to the occurrence of the crime. At the trial, defense
counsel had sought to have stricken the confession made by the
defendant on the grounds that it was involuntary because the
defendant was mentally incapable of making and understanding
the contents of his statements.
Although the court found that the confession was properly
admitted into evidence, it held that the lack of mental capacity
was an important factor to have been considered by the jury in
25. 246 S.C. 502, 508, 144 S.E2d 481, 484 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
26. 246 S.C. 580, 145 S.E2d 20 (1965).
27. 247 S.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 709 (1966).
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determining whether the purported confession was in fact vol-
untary. Since the trial court failed to give any instructions
whatsoever concerning this element of the confession, even
though there was no request to do so, the supreme court held
that prejudicial error had been committed.
The court in citing State v. Clinkseales28 stated that in the
final analysis it is the jury who must determine the factual
issue of voluntariness and that they should be properly in-
structed in this duty by the trial court.
In State v. Gamble29 the court once again reiterated the prin-
ciple that the state may not attack in any way the character of
a defendant in a criminal prosecution unless that issue be first
tendered by him. In this case the trial court admitted into
evidence the entire confession of the defendant without first
striking certain portions which alluded to the commission of
other crimes which were not material nor legally connected to
the rape allegedly committed. Although the court found that
the confession of the rape itself was voluntary and could be
considered by the jury, it held that the other portion would
have the effect of placing the "character" of the appellant in
issue and was, therefore, prejudicial.
Contrary to Gamble, the defendant in State V. Mihlings30 took
the witness stand and subjected himself to cross-examination.
Consequently he became subject to the same duties and liabilities
of witnesses generally. In this prosecution for manslaughter,
evidence elicited on cross-examination that the defendant had
been convicted of automobile theft and receiving stolen goods
was held to be competent. The court held that such evidence of
prior convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude was prop-
erly introduced on the issue of the credibility of the defendant
as a witness.
In United States v. Smith3' the court of appeals reversed the
district court and held that the defendant was entitled to a new
trial because the jury was given an unbalanced version of the
"Allen" charge. Although at the outset the district judge had
stated, "while undoubtedly the verdict of the jury should repre-
sent the opinion of each individual juror .. .,82 he did not
28. 231 S.C. 650, 99 S.E2d 663 (1957).
29. 247 S.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 709 (1966).
30. 247 S.C. 52, 145 S.E2d 422 (1965).
31. 353 F2d 166 (4th Cir. 1965).
32. Id. at 168.
19671
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otherwise inform the jurors of their duty of dissent if reason-
able grounds for such existed. Even though no objection was
made at the proper time by the court-appointed counsel, the
court held that it should note as plain error a charge which was
so clearly coercive and destructive of the right of the jurors in
the minority to maintain their position. The court also stated
that upon cross-examination prior convictions could be elicited
from the defendant but that the prosecutor could not explore
the details of such convictions.
VII. SUF MxNC OF THE EVIDENCE
The court in ,State v. Brazzel 33 reversed a conviction for the
violation of the fraudulent check statute 4 and held that there
was no substantial evidence which reasonably tended to prove
that the check was one within the purview of the statute. The
defendant had purchased a quantity of liquor for the purpose
of illicit resale and had given the check in question for it. In
accordance with the defendant's established practice, the liquor
store operator was to hold his checks out to be paid in cash by
the defendant at a later date in return for the checks. On excep-
tional occasions when the defendant did not come back, the
owner was to go ahead and deposit the checks. When in the
instant case the operator was not reimbursed in cash, he de-
posited the check, and it was returned for lack of sufficient
funds.
Having no cases precisely in point, the court analogized the
check given in this situation with one that had been postdated.
In .State v. Wnter35 it was held that a postdated check was a
promise to pay at a future time and did not come within the
provisions of the fraudulent check statute.
The state's case was based upon the presumption of fraudu-
lent intent arising under section 8-177. The court held, however,
that the state's primary burden was proving that the check
actually came within the provisions of the statute. Based upon
the facts of the case, the court found that it was not reasonably
inferable that the check was within the scope of the statute and
held that the trial judge should have directed a verdict of
acquittal.
33. 248 S.C. 118, 149 S.E2d 339 (1966).
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-176 (1962).
35. 98 S.C. 294, 82 S.E. 419 (1914).
[VTol. 19
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VIII HABEAS CORPUS
During this survey period the court was presented with many
habeas corpus petitions, none of which have striking signifi-
cance and most of which were denied upon the following
grounds:
1. Habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for appeal for
the correction of errors of law. Tyler v. State,"8 Wheeler v.
State.3
7
2. Habeas corpus will not lie to review the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain a conviction. Shelnut v. State,18 Dickson v.
State. 9
3. Habeas corpus is not available to test the legality of a
conviction or sentence where a decision in the prisoner's favor
will leave him in lawful confinement under another existing
sentence. !cf all v. State,40 Shelnut v. State,4 1 Tyler v. State.
42
4. Habeas corpus petitions must contain an adequate state-
ment of facts to make possible an intelligent judgment on the
merits of the petition. It is incumbent upon the applicant to
make at least a prima facie showing entitling him to relief.
Welch v. AaDougall,43 Dickson v. State.
44
5. Persons seeking relief by writ of habeas corpus have the
burden to sustain allegations of their petitions by the prepon-
derance of evidence. Bailey v. faDougall.45
The writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy is
actually of limited value.48 State courts have restricted its use
by various procedural rules. By application of the concept of
waiver, state courts have held that the failure of an accused to
36. 247 S.C. 34, 145 S.E2d 434 (1965).
37. 247 S.C. 393, 147 S.E2d 627 (1966).
38. 247 S.C. 41, 145 S.E.2d 420 (1965).
39. 247 S.C. 153, 146 S.E2d 257 (1966).
40. 247 S.C. 15, 145 S.E2d 419 (1965).
41. 247 S.C. 41, 145 S.E.2d 420 (1965).
42. 247 S.C. 34, 145 S.E2d 434 (1965).
43. 246 S.C. 258, 143 S.E.2d 455 (1965).
44. 247 S.C. 153, 146 S.E.2d 257 (1966).
45. 247 S.C. 1, 145 S.E2d 425 (1965).
46. See Wright, Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The
Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALE L.J. 895 (1966); Meador,
Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Post-conviction Re-
view, 50 A.B.AJ. 928 (1964).
19671
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observe court procedural rules precludes his right to later raise
the question of a denial of a constitutionally guaranteed right.
As a consequence of the fact that the writ of habeas corpus is
not a substitute for appeal, 47 the failure to perfect a timely
appeal will forever terminate a prisoner's right to get a state
hearing on the merits of an issue.
But the United States Supreme Court, by use of the elastic
concept of the due process clause, has expanded federal sub-
stantive rights and has complemented this development by an
equally important phase in the amplification of the procedural
protections of those rights.48 Through the recent decisions of
Fay v. NoiW49 and Townsend v. Saiz 0 the Court has provided
that a state prisoner may go into the federal courts on a habeas
corpus petition and get a full evidentiary hearing on all federal
issues. The federal courts have the power to look behind the
facade of state procedural grounds which would otherwise block
a review in the state courts.
Therefore, in order that the states may retain substantial
control over their administration of criminal justice, it is of
dire necessity that they adopt a waiver standard which is no
stricter than the federal standard5 ' and provide each petitioner
a full review of all federal claims.
One major step in this direction is section 9(a) of the Pro-
posed Defense of Indigents Act. This section provides that
under proper circumstances counsel may be appointed for the
filing of a writ of habeas corpus. Appointment of counsel
would greatly facilitate the processing of writs and the presen-
tation of all federal issues.
52
IX. YMIsCUANEOUS
In State . lecWaters3 the court once again reiterated the
principle that the state has no right of appeal from a directed
verdict of not guilty.
47. E.g., Tyler v. State, 247 S.C. 34, 145 S.E.2d 434 (1965); Wheeler v.
State, 247 S.C. 393, 147 S.E.2d 627 (1966).
48. 54 CAL. L. REv. 1262, 1299 (1966).
49. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
50. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
51. As explained in Noia, only a "deliberate bypassing" of a procedural
rule by the defendant will amount to a waiver.
52. Meador, Accommodating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Post-
conviction, Review, 50 A.B.AJ. 928 (1964).
53. 246 S.C. 530, 144 S.E.2d 718 (1965).
[Vol. 19
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The court in State v. Morrison" held that the credibility of
newly discovered evidence offered in support of a new trial
motion is for the determination of the judge to whom the evi-
dence is offered. The power to weigh the evidence and evaluate
its credibility is his, and his judgment wili not be disturbed
except for abuse of his discretion.
A novel question dealing with the state's waiver of its right
to require a prisoner to complete his prison sentence was pre-
sented on habeas corpus petition in Scott v. MacDougall.55
Pursuant to an executive order of the governor, the petitioner
was removed from his confinement in the South Carolina Cor-
rectional Institution and sent to Florida to stand trial there.
Upon his conviction of murder, the petitioner was returned to
South Carolina. The petitioner claimed that the South Carolina
Constitution did not grant such power of release as was here
exercised and that lacking such power the Governor's action
operated as a permanent waiver of South Carolina's jurisdiction
of his person.
In dismissing the petition, the court held that the power
of a state to release temporarily one of its prisoners so that
another state can subject him to trial is a power inherent in
sovereignty and, therefore, needs no affirmative statutory
authority.
A reversal by the circuit court of the Tax Commission's con-
viction of a beer supplier was upheld by the state supreme court
in South Carolina Tax Comvm' v. Schafer Distrib. Co. 57 The
defendant was charged with having violated section 4-204 of the
South Carolina Code by selling beer on Sunday. The court held,
however, that since the offer by officials at Shaw Air Force
Base to purchase the beer was conditioned upon immediate
delivery at the base, title did not pass prior to the delivery upon
federal grounds, within the federal jurisdiction. The convic-
tion for violating the state liquor law was precluded, therefore,
since the actual sale did not occur within the state's jurisdiction.
The laws, rules and regulations of the state of South Carolina
have no application within Shaw Air Force Base.5 s
THOmAS H. Crmu , JR.
54. 246 S.C. 575, 145 S.E2d 15 (1965).
55. 246 S.C. 252, 143 S.E2d 457 (1965).
56. S.C. CoNsT. art. 4, § 11.
57. 247 S.C. 491, 148 S.E.2d 156 (1966).
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-132 (1962).
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